Political Aspects of European Integration
COURSE ESSAY
Has the EU reached the limits of integration?
By: Yaroslav Sinitsov, EUBL
Instructor: Desmond Dinan,
Visiting Professor, University of Amsterdam
Introduction
Before answering
this question, let us face some obvious facts. So far, the European Union has
been the most advanced and successful alliances of the independent countries in
the modern history. One cannot deny that it is only the EU which established –
at least in the first pillar – a new legal order for its Member States, by
which they voluntarily shared their sovereignty based on the rule of law in
order to achieve the common task, as set forth by Article 2 of the Treaty
Establishing the European Community: ‘...to promote throughout the Community a
harmonious and balanced development of economic activities, sustainable and
non-inflationary growth respecting the environment, a high degree of
convergence of economic performance, a high level of employment and of social
protection, the raising of a standard of living and quality of life, and
economic and social cohesion and solidarity among Member States.’
Why Integrate?
But why integrate? What made European governments act against their cautious political interests? The answer was given by Jean Monnet, one of the founding fathers of the European Communities and a lover of aphorisms: ‘People only accept changes when faced with necessity, and only recognise necessity when the crisis is upon them’. I couldn’t agree more with the first part of Monnet’s saying, but I would like to replace the word ‘only’ with the word ‘better’ in its second part. A deep crisis is probably the most powerful impetus to bring peoples and countries together, although not the only one. This is exactly what happened immediately after the World War II. The need for fundamental political and economic change in Europe was extremely strong. As the Cold War commenced and the Iron Curtain abruptly divided the continent, integration became a means by which the Western Europe could defend itself, in close co-operation with the United States, against the external Soviet threat and the internal communist threat. The need for a stronger and united Europe outweighed an initial desire of the Allies to pasteurise Germany. A stronger Europe must have a strong Western Germany. At that time the Europe was on the move to integrate. And it has been on the move to integrate since then. However, the dialectics of the integration has dramatically changed with the change of the world affairs in the years 1989-1992. The old dialectics was that of the Cold War, with the familiar and multiple interactions between the two Europes, the two alliances and the two great powers. The new dialectics is of a pan-European solidarity and all-European integration, and it has never been tried before.
Multi-Speed Integration
Naturally, in some areas governments tend to reach agreements more easily. ‘The least disputed goal of European Construction is the large market without borders; even those Member States with reservations over other objectives do not dispute this one’. This explains why the first pillar of the EU – economic integration – has virtually reached supranational level. Community member states are willing to share their sovereignty in this field because it is clearly in their interest to do so. The European Single Market has become the world’s largest domestic market. It has contributed significantly to the economic growth, though its full potential has not yet been realised. But ‘...the political will is evident. This needs to be translated into targeted action.’
By contrast, quite little has been achieved since Maastricht in the two other pillars of the EU – Common and Foreign Security Policy (CFSP) and Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) which still remain intergovernmental. This has become a reality in the integration process: the integration speeds in the first pillar as compared to the other two pillars vary dramatically. ‘Economic integration and security co-operation have always been a couple dancing apart from each other on the same dance floor. Despite its recurrent crises and setbacks, the process of economic integration has tended to follow the neo-functionalist logic of the expansiveness and sectoral integration... European security co-operation has always lagged behind in this respect.’
By common agreement, CFSP was one of the major disappointments of Maastricht. After all, Maastricht proposed not only a common foreign and security policy, but declared the eventual aim to be a common defence. This has inevitably lead to the relationship between the EU and the defence alliance, the Western European Union (WEU), being put at stake. This has become even more challenging since the founding treaty of the WEU expires in 1998. However, the EU does not seem to be willing to take control in this area, as it is felt that the EU is being backed up by its major defence partner – the United States. The US has always been able to act (and this is what happened when the war in former Yugoslavia broke out) as a ‘saviour of Europe’ in defence and peace-keeping matters.
Similarly, JHA pillar which includes issues of combating international crime and fraud, and issues related to a common approach to immigration policy is a hard nut to crack for the EU because of the national sensitivity to these. However, there has been some progress in